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CORPORATIONS-THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IN CORPORATE
ORGANIZATION-ScoPE OF PowERs-From the very beginning of
the use of the corporate structure as a device for carrying on the businesses and activities of man, it has been apparent that the nominal
brain, the board of directors, could not feasibly run the affairs of the
inanimate entity unless certain powers could be delegated to officers
and agents. The early case of Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor 1 illustrates the judicial recognition of delegated powers. The charter authorized all business of ordinary nature to be transacted by a board of
directors of twenty-three. The court wisely held:
" ... But it would be a very extraordinary construction of the
charter in this respect, to hold that the board of twenty-three
directors, or a majority thereof, must meet and act whenever any
corporate power was to be exercised, and that no delegation of authority could be made to subordinate agents, to committees, or to a
quorum consisting of a smaller number."
The Hoyt case also established the ·prevailing doctrine that the
board of directors is authorized to act by virtue of the charter from the
state and not as an arm of the body of stockholders.2 For the board of
directors of a corporation does not stand in the same relation to the corporate body which a private agent holds toward his principal. In the
strict relation of principal and agent, all the authority is derived by
delegation from the former, and if the power of substitution is rn;it conferred in the appointment, it cannot exist at all. But for corporate
bodies the powers of the board of directors are, in a very important
sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer, nor
can they revoke those powers. They are derivative only in the sense of
being received from the state in the act of incorporation. The directors
convened as a board are the primary possessors of all the powers which
the charter confers, and like private principals, they may delegate to
agents of their own appointment the performance of any acts which
they themselves can perform.
England, perhaps, has gone further in the delegation of powers
field than has the United States, and many of the English companies
relieve their boards of most of their functions by means of the managing director scheme. This official is usually one of the directors and is
appointed by the board to superintend the business. His powers are
set by the articles of the company, either ( r) as to what the managing
director ·can do, or ( 2) as to what the board may delegate to the manag19 N.Y. 207 at 216 (1859).
But see Tempel v. Dodge, 89 Tex. 69, 32 S.W. 514, 33 S.W. 222 (1895),
which seems to indicate that the charter provision authorizing a board of directors to
manage the corporate business is conclusive.
1

2
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ing director. 3 English courts are quick to protect third parties dealing
with the managing director, and will bind the corporation even though
the managing director is only a de facto agent.4 It is interesting to note
that the managing director is not regarded in the same light as officers
of American corporations, for England does not consider him to be an
officer or servant of the corporation, but regards him as generally a regular director, serving over and above his usual duties. 5 This view seems
to be in accord with the standard set up for executive committees in the
United States.
Executive committees in the United States will be discussed from
the standpoint of their development, their organization, and the nature
and extent of their powers.
I.

The right of the board of directors to delegate the transaction of
ordinary and routine business to officers and agents is undoubted and
long recognized as necessary. Justice Story declared:

". . . If officers of the corporation openly exercise a power
which presupposes a delegated authority for the purpose, and
other corporate acts show that the corporation must have contemplated the legal existence of such authority, the acts of such
officers will be deemed tightful, and the delegated authority will
be presumed." 6
Another early case said, "all acts within the powers of a corporation
may be performed by agents of its own selection." 1 It is clear i11 most
instances that nondiscretionary duties may be delegated to officers.8 For
82 SoL. J. 146 (1938).
,
Biggerstaff v. Rowatt's Wharf, [ 1896] 2 Ch. 93, where the managing director
hypothecated debts owing to the company over to the creditors, and the question arose
as to the validity or effect of the transaction. The articles of the company authorized
the board of directors to appoint a managing director and to delegate to him such of ,
the powers of the board as they should think fit. There was no minute showing that
the managing director had so been appointed by the board, but he had acted in that
capacity; nor was there any minute delegating any powers to a managing director.
5
ln re·Newspaper Proprietary Syndicate, [1900] 2 Ch. 349, managing director
not such employee as to be entitled to preferential treatment in regard to sums owed
him by the company; Normandy v. Ind, Coope & Co., [1908] I Ch. 84, where it
was held the company could not pension faithful, long-time managing director, because
he did not fall within the phrase "persons in the employment of the company."
6
Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 64 at 70 (1827).
7 Barnes v. Ontario Bank, 19 N.Y. 152 at 158 (1859), a bank corporation may
constitute cashier its valid agent.
8 Seemingly nondiscretionary powers and duties could not be delegatel in Lyon
v. Jerome, 26 Wend. (N.Y.) 484 (1841), where canal commissioners could not authorize engineers to take charge of the surveying operations, and in Gillis v. Bailey, 21
N.H. 149 (1850), where board of directors was powerless to authorize re-entry for
condition broken and subsequent releasing of the premises.
8
4
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instance, the corporation may authorize the president to sell and assign
its negotiable paper; 9 directors of railroads may delegate rate-fixing to
agents; 10 directors may authorize two of their number to execute corporate notes; 11 an agent may be appointed to execute a deed, and such
appointment is not a corporate act that need be done within the state of
incorporation, but is a delegation of authority.12
But in matters involving discretion there are decisions to the effect
that the directors cannot delegate that discretion to officers and agents.
For example, directors of a holding company cannot place the stock it
holds in a voting trust for a period of years; 13 directors cannot delegate
the question whether a conditional subscription to shares should be
accepted; 14 directors must decide whether to forfeit and sell stock for
nonpayment of calls; 15 power to locate the route of a railroad cannot be
delegated; 16 directors alone can pass on paper offered for discount; 11
power to make assessments is nondelegable.18
It was but a short step from investing corporate officers and agents
with certain powers to the appointment from the board itself of special
committees whose function was to operate in a narrow, specific field:
It was early decided that committees that merely examine and report
to the board are only advisory and their reports are not binding unless
approved.19 In Greensboro Gas Co. v. l-l ome Oil & Gas Co.,20 a resolution authorized a committee to make and report an agreement. The
court decided that such committee was not thus authorized to make and
enter a binding contract before reporting. A mere auditing committee
9
Stevens v. Hill, 29 Me. 133 (1848); Northhampton Bank v. Pepoon, 11 Mass.
288 (1814), direct officer to assign over securities.
10
Manchester & Lawrence R.R. v. Fisk, 33 N.H. 297 (1856), and assent of
directors to such rates is presumed.
11
Leavitt v. Oxford, 3 Utah 265 (1883).
12
Arms v. Conant, 36 Vt. 744 (1864).
18
Knickerbocker Inv. Co. v. Voorhees, 100 App. Div. 414, 91 N.Y.S. 816
( I 90 5), because it is the duty of the directors to manage and control the property of
the corporation instead of delegating that task to another.
14 In re Leeds Banking Co., L.R. I Ch. 561 (1866).
15
York & Cumberland R.R. v. Ritchie, 40 Me. 425 (1855).
16
Weidenfeld v. Sugar Run R.R., (C.C.Pa. 1892) 48 F. 615.
17
Percy v. Millaudon, 3 La. 568 (1832).
18
Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Chase, 56 N.H. 341 (1876); Silver Hook
Road v. Greene, 12 R.L 164 (1878). But see Read v. Memphis Gayoso Gas Co., 9
Heisk. (56 Tenn.) 545 (1872), where such delegation to make assessments to president
was held valid.
19
Southington Ecclesiastical Society v. Gridley, 20 Conn. I 99 ( I 8 50). But see
Re Cincinnati Iron Store Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1909) 167 F. 486, where advisory committee authorized president to borrow money for the corporation and court said company was bound, holding that bo~rd of directors had at least given implied authority
to the action.
20
222 Pa. 4, 70 A. 940 (1908).
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cannot rescind a contract or determine future action of the company. 21
The directors of the railroad in East Cleveland Ry. v. Everett 22
authorized a special committee to negotiate for purchasers and to sell an
issue of bonds. The court concluded that the committee had the power
to employ a broker, but they could not, in absence of special authority,
authorize the broker _to secure purchasers at less than par. Finance
committees of banking corporations, while sounding in the category of
limited, special organs, nevertheless operate in much the same fashion
as the board of directors, for their authority is quite general, and they
generally exercise the functions of the board in the interim between
board meetings. 28
The banking corporations blazed the way with finance committees,
but the business world was quick to follow suit. The exigencies of modern business necessitated a streamlined body to govern in the place of
the more or less unwieldy and slow-moving board of directors. To
that end, many corporations,24 because. of practical necessity, heeded
the words of Justice Story, quoted above, and delegated authority "to
subordinate agents, to committees, or to a quorum consisting of a
smaller number," and in one form or another adopted the executive
committee. Power for the board of directors to employ such a device
was found in many places. In the Hoyt case,25 such power was implied
from the idea that the board of directors was a principal which could
utilize agents of its own choosing. The supreme court of Missouri in
Jones v. Williams 26 supported an executive committee in these words:
" ... The directors have the power, without statutory authority, to delegate to officers, agents or executive committees the
power to transact, not only the ordinary and routine business, but
business requiring the highest degree of judgment and discretion .
. . . The power expressly given by statute to the board of directors
'to appoint such subordinate officers and agents as the business of
the corporation may require,' does not limit or diminish the common law power to delegate authority."
Most of the states include a provision for corporate executive com21 Skinner v. Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co., 140 N.Y. 217,
35 N.E. 491 (1893).
.
22
15 Ohio Cir. Ct. 181 (1898).
23
Peurifoy v. Loyal, 154 S.C. 267, 151 S.E. 579 (1930).
24 All manner of associations adopted the executive committee. An unincorporated
camp meeting association was authorized to delegate power to an executive committee
to make regulations as to the use of the grounds of the association. Round Lake Assn.
v. Kellogg, 141 N.Y. 348, 36 N.E. 326 (1894).
25 See note 1, supra.
26
139 Mo. 1 at 25, 26, 39 S.W. 486, 40 S.W. 353 (1897).
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mittees much in the same words as the legislature of Michigan
adopted: 27
" ... The directors ... may appoint an executive committee of
such board to have active management of the business affairs of
such corporation in the interim between full board meetings,
subject to such restrictions and limitations as the board may impose upon such executive committee."
Charter provisions in many instances provide for the executive committee, and as the Alabama court said in Taylor v. Agricultural &
Mechanical Association,28
" ... power [ to execute a mortgage] devolves upon the executive
committee, not by delegation from the directors, nor as their
agents; but by operation of the constitution, and as agents of the
association. . .. The executiqn of the mortgage ... was included
in the general grant of power to the executive committee to transact official business."
Another charter provided that the business was to be managed by three
executive officers, and no directors were ever elected; the court held
that by virtue of the charter, the three officers were akin to an executive
committee and could execute a mortgage binding upon the corporation. 29 Other courts so simply say that charter authority to appoint
agents implies the right to appoint an executive committee.
Many executive committees function because of by-laws enacted by
the corporation. A typical by-law reads:
"The board of directors may from time to time appoint, and
remove at pleasure, an executive committee, consisting of as many
of such members of the board as shall, in the resolution of their
appointment, be designated, and shall from time to time appoint
one of such committee to act as chairman thereof during the pleasure of the board. The executive committee shall have and may
exercise all the powers of the board of directors in the management of the business and affairs of the corporation during the intervals between meetings of the board, except the power to fill
vacancies in the board and the power to amend the by-laws." 31
Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 9987.
68 Ala. 229 at 236, 237 (1880).
29
Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Kentucky Glass-Works Co., 106 Ky. 7, 50 S.W. 2,
1092, 51 s.w. 180 (1899).
so Olcott v. Tioga R.R., 27 N.Y. 546 (1863); Sheridan Electric Light Co. v.
Chatham Nat. Bank, 127 N.Y. 517, 28 N.E. 467 (1891).
81 Lawrence v. Atlantic Paper & Pulp Corp., (C.C.A. 5th, 1924) 298 F. 246 at
249. The by-laws may allow executive committee to consist of one person. Re Taurine
.Co., 25 Ch. D. u8 (1883).
27
28
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But, as the case of Tempel v. Dodge 32 has stated, a very small minority
of decisions holds that the corporation cannot substitute an executive
committee through by-laws, when the charter says that the board shall
manage. On the other hand, the stockholders may take the initiative
and expressly authorize an executive committee,33 and the corporation
cannot then repudiate the committee's action. 34 But the stockholders
cannot elect a committee not consisting of directors and compel the
directors to act with the committee in corporate matters.35
Acts of a de facto executive committee have been upheld on the basis
that the corporation and board of directors had allowed the committee
to act for a considerable period.86 But the Florida court 87 declared
that when the action of an executive committee was controverted the
fact of creation of the committee must be proved by minutes of the
board of directors.
2.

Ordinarily the executive committee is composed of a grou.p of the
existing directors, and the executive committee in the Hoyt case consisted of any five or more directors who attended meetings of which notice was given to all. 38 The charter may provide for the executive officers to serve as an executive committee; 39 or, the board may allow
some of its members to so act and manage the company.4-0 In at least
one case a group of stockholders combined with a part of the corporate
officers and acted in behalf of the corporation so as to bind the corpora89 Tex. 68, 32 S.W. 514, 33 S.W. 222 (1895).
United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 470, 33 S.Ct. 162 (1913), unless
otherwise provided by law, stockholders may authorize board of directors to delegate
their duties, thus executive committee derives its authority from the stockholders through
the board of directors; Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 163 U.S. 564, 16
S.Ct. u73 (1896).
34
Bankers' Money Order Assn. v. Nachod, 128 App. Div. 281, 112 N.Y.S. 721
(1908).
~ 5 Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85 (1880).
36 Salem Iron Co. v. Lake Superior Consol. Iron Mines, (C.C.A. 3d, 1901) Il2
F. 239.
37 Cottondale State Bank v. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co., 61 Fla. 143, 54 So.
896 (19u).
38 Lovell v. Women's Pennsylvania Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,
235 Pa. 601, 84 A. 518 (1912), a particula.r by-law provided that the ten vice-presidents were to be on the executive committee; organization amended to increase to
thirteen vice-presidents, and held, three additional vice-presidents automatically become
executive-committeemen ..
39 Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Kentucky Glass-Works Co., :r-o6 Ky. 7, 50 S.W. 2,
1092, 51 S.W. 180 (1899).
40 York v. Mathis, 103 Me. 67 (1907), never any formal vote giving member of
board power to act as executive committee, but corporation bound by his acts.
82

88
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tion. 41 Courts and custom have imposed a few sensible regulations upon
the composition of the committee: the majority of directors cannot
exclude the minority from attending me~tings and from being heard by
delegating power to an executive committee that completely eclipses
the minority faction; 42 the board cannot exclude one or more of their
number and summarily form a committee of a part of the board; 48
the corporation is estopped from denominating a called meeting of the
board a meeting of the executive committee when less than a majority
of the directors report.44
The executive committee must meet certain formal requirements
before it can act, generally to the e:ffect that the executive committee is
governed by the same rules that apply• to meetings of the full board
regarding notice of meetings, quorum and number necessary to determine whether a quorum is present.45 But courts have said that the majority rules only if all ·members of the committee are present,46 while
others say that a majority constitutes a quorum; 47 and, of course, many
by-laws establish the formal requirements. 48 The court in Shaw v.
Bankers' Nat. Life Ins. Co. 49 stated the solution very neatly as follows,
that the executive committee cannot function after a majority have
withdrawn, for joint action was contemplated; but the corporation may
be bound if it accepts the benefits of a contract irregularly made by the
41 Du Pont v. Du Pont, (C.C.A. 3d, 1919) 256 F. 129. But see Charlestown
Boot & Shoe Store v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85 (1880), to the effect that stockholders
cannot elect committees not consisting of directors and compel the directors to act with
the committee in corporate matters.
42
Great Western Ry. v. Rushout, 5 DeG. & Sm. 290, 64 Eng. Rep. Il21 (1852).
48
Kyshe v. Alturas Gold, 4 T.L.R. 331 (1888).
44 Matter of Election of Directors of New York & Westchester Town Site Co.,
145 App. Div. 623, 130 N.Y.S. 414 (1911).
45 McNeil v. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 154 Mass. 277, 28 N.E. 245
(1891), thus a majority of the committee can act.
46 Young v. Schenk, 64 Wash. 90, 116 P. 588 (1911).
47 Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 163 U.S. 564, 16 S.Ct. 1173
(1896), holding the corporation bound although the governing airector appointed by
the president was not at the meeting; Young v. Canada A. & P. S.S. Co., 211 Mass.
453, 91 N.E. 1098 (191-2); Marshall v. Industrial Federation of America, 84 N.Y.S.
866 (App. Div. 1903); Canada-Atlantic & Plant S.S. Co. v. Flanders, (C.C.A. 1st,
1906) 145 F. 875. In Peurifoy v. Loyal, 154 S.C. 267, 151 S.E. 579 (1930), a
majority of the committee constituted a quorum, and four of five were present at the
meeting. The suit was brought on a surety question, and two of the executive committee were the guilty officers. The court held that the executive committee did not
know of the loss in order to satisfy the surety within the prescribed ten days, for interest
disqualified two of the four at the meeting in question, so it was not a legal meeting of
the executive committee.
48
Rockford, R.I. & St. L. R.R. v. Sage, 65 Ill. 328 (1872).
•
49 61 Ind. App. 346, 112 N.E. 16 (1916), and the court also points out that the
board cannot make a contract with the executive committee (general managers) for
longer than the terms of office of the directors.
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executive committee. 50 It seems to be a general rule, however, that one
member of the executive committee cannot bind the corporation any
more than one individual director.n A few jurisdictions have said that
the executive committee can act only as a whole; 52 another held that
the executive committee could not act unless all were present, although
a majority might govern; 53 still another said that the by-laws must
expressly confer authority on a majority of the committee. 54 In companies where the executive committee can act only with the president,
action without him is void.55
It has generally been determined that the executive committee may
act only in a limited period of time, viz., the interim between board
meetings. In Commercial Wood & Cement Co. v. Northampton Portland Cement Co. 56 a board meeting was called for a particular afternoon. The executive committee met the morning of the scheduled
meeting, and made a contract which the board disapproved that afternoon. The court decided that the impending board meeting precluded executive committee action, saying:
" ... the plaintiff was put upon its inquiry as to the scope of
the powers of the executive committee to bind the corporation
thereby. It was bound to know that the committee was always subject to the orders of the board and that the field for executive actioll'was only free to it when the directors had not themselves appropriated it. It would be an extraordinary proposition to maintain, as it seems to me, that a committee, appointed to exercise the
powers of the board, when it was not in session, could conclude
the corporation by action taken in anticipation of the actual convening of the directors under the notice of the secretary."
Metropolitan Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Domestic Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 44 N.J. Eq. 568, 14 A. 907 (1888).
51 Young v. United States Mortgage & Trust Co.,_214 N.Y. 279, 108 N.E. 418
(1915).
52 Caldwell v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 53 App. Div. 245, 65 N.Y.S.
826 (1900), so corporation correctly rejects a contract claim for employment when
such contract was made by only one of three of the executive committee.
53 In re Liverpool Household Stores Assn., 62 L.T. 873, 59 L.J. (Ch.) 616
(1890).
54 Tracy v. Guthrie County Agr. Society, 47 Iowa 27 (1877).
55 Com Exchange Bank v. Cumberland Coal Co., I Bosw. (N.Y. Super.) 436
(1857), and all members of the executive committee must join, not just a majority.
But see Roebling's Sons Co. v. Barre & Montpelier Traction & Power Co., 76 Vt. 131,
56 A. 530 (1903), where one member of the committee ordered the goods, another
acquiesced, and the third had no knowledge of the affair, the court held that the
corporation was bound.
56
190 N.Y. 1 at 5, 82 N.E. 730 (1907).
50
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Third parties in some instances may protect their rights by dealing
with the executive committee rather than the board. One case demonstrated that a stockholder's request to the committee to bring action to
remedy a corporate wrong was sufficient. 57 But it is not advocated that
third parties content themselves with merely giving the notice required
to a director who is also a member of the executive committee, for success depends upon overcoming the presumption that notice to individual
directors is not notice to the corporation.58
The members of the executive committee are liable for mismanagement on the same basis as directors or trustees. 59 This responsibility has
been transferred to the directors, who may be held liable for negligence
in not keeping closer check on the executive committee, which, in turn,
was supposed to watch the president. 60 Responsibility has even been
placed upon the stockholders themselves, as in situations where the
executive committee was authorized to sell stock, and false representations were made by the committee.61

3.
Assuming that an executive committee has been authorized and
then organized so as to meet the scrutiny of the courts, the most important question in the entire field of executive committees comes into
view; that is, what is the nature and extent of the powers the com--i
mittee may exercise? Leaving aside for the moment the welter of
individual cases on just what can be done by this agency, two general
precepts running through the question are easily discernible: (I) Is
the business of such nature that the board of directors could delegate
it to the executive committee? (2) Has the board in fact so delegated
its power? To approach the problem of exercisable powers with any
hope of evolving a set of principles as to the scope of the executive
committee's functions, a division must be made between special powers,
general powers with and without ratification by the corporation, and
those powers delegable to agents by the executive committee itself.
Committees that exercise special powers are usually temporary in
character, and in the usual run of cases, no difficulty is experienced.
In addition to special routine duties, the committee may be authorized
57

Hazard v. Durant, II R.I. 195 (1875).
Shattuck v. Guardian Trust Co. of New York, 145 App. Div. 734, 130 N.Y.S.
658 (1911), judgment reversed, 204 N.Y. 200, 97 N.E. 517 (1912), where court
sent case back for new trial to perhaps show that executive committee member was presumed to have communicated.
59
Williams v. McKay, 46 N.J. Eq. 25, 18 A. 824 (1889).
6°Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co. of N:Y., 223 N.Y. 103, I 19 N.E.
237 (1918), held, fact question for jury.
61
Garret Co. v. Appleton, 184 N.Y. 557, 76 N.E. 1099 (1905), affg. IOI App.
Div. 507, 92 N.Y.S. 136 (1905).
58
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to :file a petition in bankruptcy; 62 make contracts to secure patent rights
under power to "make necessary arrangements for the transfer"; 68 or
:fix the toll rates for driving of logs.64 The problems under special
powers arise when the executive committee seems to exceed its specific
authority. Courts have upheld the right of an executive committee to
employ expediters to carry out specific contracts; 65 but in contrast the
Connecticut court in Chesnut-Hill Reservoir Co. v. Chase 66 determined
that the committee was only authorized to contract for purchase of the
land and could not give the note of the corporation in payment there- '
for. Thus, the vendor could not recover on the note, but he could sue
on the count for land sold and conveyed. The corporation may save
excessive action by the executive committee through express ratifica-:tion,6~ or, by accepting the benefits of the unauthorized acts, estop
itself from defending suits on such transactions. 68 But if there is no
ratification and no ground for estoppel, the corporation cannot be bound
by excessive acts of the special committee.69
A number of well.:.recognized limitations govern the use of general
power by the executive <:_ommittee which operates .under a by-law or
grant usually reading, "full powers of the board of directors when
said board is not in session." In Hayes v. Canada, Atlantic & Plant
S.S. Co.,70 the executive committee under such a grant was held to be
limited to ordinary business affairs of the corporation, not unrestricted
powers, and could not fix the compensation of one of their number as
an officer of the corporation, amend by-laws so as to change the mode
of calling stockholders' and directors' meetings, nor act in their own
pecuniary interests so as to absorb the entire powers of the corporation
for an indefinite period. Similar limitations in other cases include: no
power to discharge vice-president and general manager, for power to
manage business is not authority to remove the officers; 71 no power in
executive committee to issue stock; 72 and no power to purchase the
62

Law,rence v. Atlantic Paper & Pulp Corp., (C.C.A. 5th, 1924) 298 F. 246.
Andres v. Fry, 113 Cal. 124, 45 P. 534 (1896).
64
Black River Imp. Co. v. Holway, 85 Wis. 344, 55 N.W. 418 (1893).
65
Conservation Co. v. Stimpson, 136 Md. 314, 110 A. 495 (1920).
66
14 Conn. 123 (1840).
·
67 Merchants' Union Barbed Wire Co. v. Rice, 70 Iowa 14, 29 N.W. 784
(1886).
.
68
Greensboro Gas Co. v. Home Oil & Gas Co., 222 Pa. 4, 70 A. 940 (1908);
Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 43 Mass. 163 (1840), executive committee set up to sell
property but mortgaged it-held valid, especially when board subsequently accepted
papers connected with it.
69 East Cleveland Ry. v. Everett, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct. 181 (1898).
70
(C.C.A. 1st, 1910) 181 .F. 289.
71 Fensterer v. Pressure Lighting Co., 85 Misc. 621, 149 N.Y.S. 49 (1914).
72 Ryder v. Bushwick R.R., 134 N.Y. 83, 31 N.E. 251 (1892), power to run
corporation affairs includes only construction, repairing, equipping, and operation of
the railroad.
I
63
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corporation's own stock, for this was not done in the course of business. 78 Nor can the executive committee vote itself large compensation
for promotion services, and cannot bind nonassenting stockholders by a
merger accomplished solely through the executive committee.74 Commercial Wood & Cement Co. v. Northampton Portland Cement Co. 15
also indicated that the selection of a sole selling agency for a term of
years by the executive committee was outside the scope of ordinary
and ministerial business. Tracy v. Guthrie County Agr. Society 16 took
the position that an executive committee could not purchase real estate
where the society would have suffered no detriment by delaying action
until the next board meeting.
A highly controversial question is presented when the courts are
faced with judging the validity of acts of agents appointed or purporting to act for the executive committee which was established with
general powers. The Massachusetts court in I 808 held that power
in the executive committee to delegate its authority must be expressly
conferred and cannot be presumed.77 The anomalous decision in Olcott
v. Tioga R.R.18 contains the statement that an executive committee
cannot delegate its powers to one of their number. The president and
executive committee conducted the business, the notes in question were
drawn by the president with the authority of the executive committee,
and the holder of the note succeeded in his suit. Thus, it might be
said that the case stands for the proposition that the executive committee can delegate to agents of its own choosing. Assuming that delegation by the executive committee is valid, some courts say that the
body must pass specific resolutions as to what they wish done, and that
the executive committee cannot make wholesale delegation of power; 79
that one executive committeeman cannot bind the whole 80 even though
he be chairman of the group.81 Other cases take opposite views and
78 Maryland Trust Co. v. National Mechanics' Bank, 102 Md. 608, 63 A. 70
(1906).
74
Blatchford v. Ross, 54 Barb. (N.Y. S.Ct.) 42 (1869).
75 190 N.Y. 1, 82 N.E. 730 (1907). But see, Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry., 163 U;S. 564, 16 S.Ct. II73 (1896), where executive committee was upheld in 999 year lease.
76
47 Iowa 27 (1877).
77 Tippets v. Walker, 4 Mass. 595 (1808), and so held executive committee
liable individually on the contract.
78
27 N.Y. 546 (1863).
79 lndian Refining Co. v. Buhrman, (C.C.A. 2d, 1915) 220 F. 426.
so Young v. United States Mortgage & Trust Co., 214 N.Y. 279, 108 N.E. 418
(1915).
81
Caskie v. International Ry., 261 N.Y. 47, 184 N.E. 489 (1933). But see
Title Ins. Co. of Richmond v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, 164 S.E. 387 (1932), where the
executive committee had full power to employ officer, held bound by statement of one
of its members, made to such officer, in presence of committee members and without
protest, to effect that executive committee was willing to employ him.
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allow delegation from the executive committee with no formality, 82
or else a simple resolution. 83
The real nub of any discussion concerning the powers of the executive committee is whether the committee can act at once to bind the
corporation, or whether everything that the executive committee does
is subject to disavowal by the board of directors or the stockholders
themselves. Some cases, as Haldeman v. Haldeman, 84 indicate that
once the executive committee has been delegated any part of the powers
of the board of directors, the corporation is bound when the executive
committee acts; or seem to say that delegation of powers to a committee expressly authorized by the stockholders themselves precludes
the corporation from repudiating executive comµiittee action. 85 It is
possible to catalogue an imposing list of functions exercised by the
executive committee and made binding on the corporation without
further action: contract to purchase patent; 86 assign equity of redemption in the pledged bonds to the pledgee; 87 institute suit when only
had power to collect; 88 make and execute a mortgage; 89 vote themselves compensation; 00 fix compensation for the officers and agents of
the corporation; 01 employ officers and agents; 02 sign notes; 93 dismiss
appeals; 04 certify creditors' bills.95
There seems to be only one case that directly says that every action
of the executive committee is subject to ratification,96 and this type of
policy, if generally practiced, would virtually hamstring the purpose
for which executive committees were devised, namely, to facilitate the
business matters of corporations. Some cases, understandably enough,
82

Culver v. Pocono Spring Water Ice Co., 206 Pa. 481, 56 A. 29 (1903);
Conservation Co. v. Stimpson, 136 Md. 314, 110 A. 495 (1920).
83
Burns v. Valley Bank of Fresno, 94 Cal. App. 254, 271 P. 107 (1928); Re
Cincinnati Iron Stove Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1909) 167 F. 486.
84
176 Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376 (1917).
85
Bankers' Money Order Assn. v. Nachod, 128 App. Div. 281, 112 N.Y.S. 721
(1908).
86
Andres v. Fry, 113 Cal. 124, 45 P. 534 {1896).
87
Bibber White Co. v. White River Valley Elec. Ry., (C.C.Vt. I<jo9) 75 F. 470.
88
St. Louis Domicile & Savings Loan Assn. v. Augustin, 2 Mo. App. 123 (1876).
89 Taylor v. Agricultural & Mechanical Assn., 68 Ala. 229 (1880); Cabot, Inc.
v. Gas Products Co., 93 Mont. 497, 19 P. (2d) 878 (1933).
90
Marshall v. Industrial Federation of America, 84 N.Y.S. 866 (App. Div. 1903).
91
Wallace v. International Trade Exhibition, 170 La. 55, 127 So. 362 (1930),
current business includes fixing compensation.
92
Title Ins. Co. of Richmond v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, 164 S.E. 387 (1932);
Young v. Canada A. & P. S.S. Co., 211 Mass. 453, 97 N.E. 1098 (1912).
93
First Nat. Bank of Binghamton v. Commercial Travelers' Home Assn. of
America, 108 App. Div. 78, 95 N.Y.S. 454 (1905).
94
Young v. Schenk, 64 Wash. 90, II6 P. 588 (1911).
95
Rockford, R.I. & St. L. R.R. v. Sage, 65 Ill. 328 (1872).
96
Indianapolis, E. R. & S.W. R.R. v. Hyde, 122 Ind. 188, 23 N.E. 706 (1890).
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hold invalid action that seems out of the ordinary unless ratification is
present.97 For instance, the executive committee of a railroad authorized sale of stock, but lack of ratification by the board· nullified the
contract; 98 and a merger engineered by the executive committee was
held not binding on nonassenting stockholders.99 But see Roebling's
Sons Co. v. Barre & Montpelier Traction & Power Co.,1° 0 where the
by-laws provided that the executive committee should perform the
general duties of the corporation, needing assent of directors for binding force, yet the executive committee was deemed to have power
under the by-laws to purchase a certain wire necessary for the operation of the railroad, although the directors had not given their previous
consent.
Subsequent ratification of ultra vires acts of the executive committee is a common practice, and is to be encouraged from the standpoint of protecting those who deal with executive committees purporting to represent the corporation in the same light as boards of
directors. The stockholders in Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Ry.101 ratified the action of the executive committee,
and this was held valid regardless of the position of the board of
directors on the matter. Also in the situation where an executive
committee was authorized to settle with X, but instead settled with a
firm in which X was interested, the company ratified and saved the
action.102
Upon familiar grounds of estoppel, many corporations have been
bound by their executive committees. Accepting benefits of the extraordinary action,103 or change of position by the other party in reliance
upon the ostensible authority,104 or mere silence and acquiescence on
the part of the corporation may validate the committee's action.105
97
Kelsey v. New England Street Ry., 60 N.J.Eq. 230, 46 A. 1059 (1900);
East Cleveland Ry. v. Everett, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct. 181 (1898).
98
Ryder v. Bushwick R.R., 134 N.Y. 83, 31 N.E. 251 (1892).
99
Blatchford v. Ross, 54 Barb. (N.Y. S.Ct.) 42 (186<J).
100
76 Vt. 131, 56 A. 530 (1903).
101
163 U.S. 564, 16 S.Ct. 1173 (1896).
102
Merchants' Union Barbed Wire Co. v. Rice, 70 Iowa 14, 29 N.W. 784
(1886).
103
Tilden v. Goldy Mach. Co., 9 Cal. App. 9, 98 P. 39 (1908); Metropolitan
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Domestic Telephone & Telegraph Co., 44 N.J.Eq. 568,
14 A. 907 (1888).
104
Greensboro Gas Co. v. Home Oil & Gas Co., 222 Pa. 4, 70 A. 940 ·(1908),
where plaintiff had been allowed to expend great sums of money; Shafer v. Spruks,
(C.C.A. 3d, 1913) 225 F. 480, executive committee inserted after-acquired property
clause in mortgage, and corporation was held bound after issue of bonds by other party
secured by such mortgage.
105
Salem Iron Co. v. Lake Superior Consol. Iron Mines, (C.C.A. 3d, 1901) II2
F. 239, de facto executive committee; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9 (1857), issue of
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4.
Very few cases involving powers of executive committees haye
appeared on the legal horizon in the last twenty years; consequently
a trend for the present and future can only be hypothecated on older
cases, modern by-laws, and a hope for a liberal judiciary. To continue
in the vein established by some cases, that acts of the executive com~
mittee must be subject to corporate approval, is to leave undisturbed
the complexities of corporate problems. Executive committees have a
purpose to fulfill, i.e., to reduce the slow and cumbersome aspects of
large business organizations to fast moving, dynamic business organs.
Such stripping of excess weight cannot be accomplished while parties
who deal with executive committees are forced to wait until the next
board meeting, or take a hazardous chance that the corporation may
in the future ratify the act or so conduct itself as to be estopped to
deny the authority existed.
It is true that many corporations through their by-laws are making
provision for more powerful executive committees. But in the background remain the cases which illustrate the type of board that is
jealous of its checkrein and retains the right of disapproval over every
executive committee act. Thus in some instances it is an empty gesture
to establish executive committees as far as outsiders are concerned.
That is the reason for the phrase "liberal judiciary." For the courts,
by recognizing the validity of executive committee actions in the ordinary scope of business without the formal approval of the corporation,
will force the corporations to the realization that the executive committee is a binding agent if used, and that third parties are justified
in relying upon the ostensible authority thereof. The boards that would
then refuse to appoint executive committees would be penalizing their
business by forcing the transactions to go through the channels of the
slow-moving board of directors machinery. In any event, such judicial
action would serve two purposes: first, clarify the extent of executive
committee powers; and second, clear the business world of the middleof-the-road boards which breed delay and litigation.
For the corporations that will continue to employ the executive
committee it is recommended that they make clear to the world that
such committees have the power to act between meetings of the board
without asking approval for all acts. This will materially speed the
business affairs of that particular corporation, and the reward of increased efficiency to the stockholders will overshadow any loss of face
thought to be suffered by the board of directors. Of course, the execubonds by executive committee without resolution of board as required by the charter;
York v. Mathis, 103 Me. 67 (1907); McNeil v. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 154
Mass. 277, 28 N.E. 245 (1891).
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rive committee should not be given the power to decide questions of
policy and matters that affect the character of the corporation itself.

Dickson M. Saunders

